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Abstract
Health-worker migration, commonly called “medical brain
drain”, refers to the mass migration of trained and skilled
health professionals (doctors, nurses, midwives) from low-
income to high-income countries. This is currently leaving
a significant number of poor countries, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, with critical staff shortages in the health-
care sector. A broad consensus exists that, where medical
brain drain exacerbates such shortages, it is unethical, and
this review presents the main arguments underpinning this
view. Notwithstanding the general agreement, which
policies are justifiable on ethical grounds to tackle brain
drain and how best to go about implementing them remains
controversial. The review offers a discussion of the specific
ethical issues that have to be taken into account when de-
ciding which policy measures to prioritise and suggests a
strategy of policy implementation to address medical brain
drain as a matter of urgency.
Key words: medical brain drain; human resources for
health; health-worker migration; ethics; policy
Introduction
Health-worker migration, commonly called ‘medical brain
drain’, is part of larger problem known as the global health
workforce crisis [1], that is, the grossly uneven distribution
of the health workforce and the critical shortage of health-
workers in world regions with a high disease burden. Med-
ical brain drain refers to the mass migration of trained and
skilled health professionals (doctors, nurses and midwifes)
from low-income to high-income countries. The unequal
distribution of the global health workforce is exacerbated
by mass emigration of doctors and nurses fleeing from poor
working and living conditions, and by the increasing re-
cruitment activities of affluent nations.
Few dispute that medical brain drain presents a serious
challenge for the healthcare systems of poor countries and
raises important ethical questions. Despite the introduction
of various policies at national and international levels, the
trend is largely unbroken and more needs to be done if the
harmful effects of medical brain drain are to be mitigated.
Policy proposals to that end are, however, controversial,
because they depend on how the underlying ethical con-
flicts are evaluated.
In this review, we present a brief overview of the data
on medical brain drain, analyse the main ethical issues at
stake, and employ them in the discussion of current policy
proposals. We limit our focus to countries with critical staff
shortages, that is, the most urgent cases in need of fair
policy solutions. We provide an extensive review of the
most recent literature, concentrating on empirical findings
and ethical arguments that have appeared in the last 5 years.
The current situation
The health workforce is distributed highly unevenly around
the world. In Africa, many countries have 0.2 or fewer doc-
tors for every 10000 people, compared to 24 in the US, 27
in the UK and 30 in Australia [2]. The nurse to popula-
tion ratio ranges from 1.1 to 10000 people in Somalia to
98 in the US and 101 in the UK. The WHO estimated that
healthcare systems with less than 23 health-workers (doc-
tors, nurses, midwifes) per 10000 people are unable to de-
liver essential health services [1]. There are 57 countries,
mainly concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), that fall
below this sufficiency threshold and are considered to face
‘critical shortages’ in health workforce, in total amounting
to shortage of 2.4 million health workers [1]. The problem
of unequal health workforce density is compounded by the
unequal distribution of the global burden of disease: Africa
carrys 24% of the global burden of disease with only 3% of
the world’s health workers (the US carries 10% of the glob-
al burden of disease with 37% of the world’s health-work-
ers) [1]. In order to meet the United Nations’ (UN) health-
related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Africa
would need a 140% scale-up of its health workforce [1].
Instead, some countries loose half to third of their doctors
and nurses after graduation.
The Swiss situation
Medical brain drain is an issue not only in poor coun-
tries, which are the focus of this article. For example,
Switzerland has almost 46 doctors and 108 nurses per
10,000 people, ranking among the highest density of
healthcare workers in the world [1]. Nonetheless, the
geographic distribution is unequal. There is internal
brain drain, with health-workers largely concentrating
in urban areas such as Zurich and Basel, leaving rural
cantons such as Uri underserved.
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Despite its decline in a few countries, health-worker migra-
tion is on the whole rising [3]. Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are the
main destination for medical migrants (47% go to the Un-
ited States). In top Anglo-American destination countries,
migrant doctors make up 22.5–39% of the national phys-
ician workforce [3]. Between 2001 and 2008 the number
of foreign-trained fully registered medical doctors has in-
creased by 70% in the US, 50% in Australia and 40% in
Canada [3].
In absolute terms, Indian doctors and Philippine nurses
make up the bulk of foreign-trained health workforce [4].
However, a better measure of the impact of medical brain
drain is the proportion of emigrating health-workers com-
pared with those that stay in their country of training. The
regions most affected by high emigration rates are Africa
and the Caribbean, with some countries exceeding 50%,
such as Guyana (72%), Mozambique (65%), Sierra Leone
(58%), Tanzania and Liberia (55%) [4].
Another way to look at medical brain drain is to calculate
the loss in terms of the cost of training of emigrants. A re-
cent study found that the total financial loss through doc-
tors’ emigrating ranges from $2.16 million for Malawi to
$1.41 billion for South Africa, and adds up to a total loss of
$2.17 billion for SSA [5]. Another study based on the cost
of training plus the expected returns over 30 years of ser-
vice estimated that Kenya loses $517,931 for every doctor
and $338,868 for every nurse who emigrates [6].
Reasons for emigration, as reported by the migrant health-
workers, are manifold. They relocate to improve their fin-
ancial conditions, attain better job prospects (working con-
ditions and career advancement), improve the security of
their family, and ensure quality education of their children
(e.g. [7]). Wage differentials are important driving forces
behind migration (e.g. [8]), with wages 3–15 times higher
in destination countries [9]. Lacks of professional oppor-
tunities and poor infrastructure have similarly strong ef-
fects on the intention to migrate (e.g. [10]). Inadequate hos-
pital equipment, long and double shifts and heavy patient
loads significantly contribute to health-worker burnout
[11]. The more health-workers leave, the more serious
these issues become, creating a vicious cycle. This is par-
ticularly relevant in SSA, where environments with high
human immune deficiency virus (HIV) prevalence repres-
ent high risks and often excessive workloads for health-
workers. (e.g. [12]). Overall, both working conditions and
personal quality of life are perceived as far better in the
destination countries.
Among the more general structural causes, war and civil
strife are obvious, major push factors [13]. War has been
found to double the expected physician emigration rate
[14]. Lack of strategic planning in poor countries and long-
term under-planning of health workforce and its education
are also significant reasons, often due to both bad gov-
ernance and scarcity of resources. In Mozambique, for ex-
ample, a country with critical shortages, graduating nurses
have to wait 4 years prior to employment owing to lack of
financial resources to fund public jobs [15]. Financial and
technical assistance by international organisations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and public-private
partnerships can also have adverse effects. Instead of
providing funding for the general employment of health-
workers, donor programmes with a particular focus on spe-
cific diseases are more likely to provide targeted drugs and
equipment, specifically train local workers to donor-selec-
ted treatment or bring in international staff [11]. In addi-
tion, they may draw away local health-workers from the
public health sector [16].
On the receiving end, in destination countries, increasing
demand due to demographic factors coupled with inad-
equate planning and undersupply of human resources for
health lead to shortages [17]. In the United States, for ex-
ample, 17,000 medical students graduated in 2012 [18] and
24,000 residencies were offered [19]. The missing 7,000
residency positions had to be filled with foreign-trained
medical graduates. Indeed, the supply of foreign-trained
health-workers has been and continues to be taken for gran-
ted in policies of human resources for health [20, 21].
Effects of medical brain drain on health outcomes
The correlation between the availability of health work-
force and health outcomes is a widely acknowledged fact
[1]. Studies have found that the lack of skilled health-work-
ers constitutes a major barrier to implementing health inter-
ventions that aim to improve maternal and child health, and
to address HIV / acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
(AIDS), malaria and tuberculosis [23, 24]. Critical health-
worker shortages strongly affect the operation of public
health systems and overburden existing staff, which in turn
raises error rates in diagnosis and interventions [15]. Crit-
ical shortage may also undermine a country’s capacity to
absorb external funds and implement international pro-
grammes of health assistance [15, 25].
How to exactly substantiate the direct impact of health-
worker emigration on mortality and morbidity is contested.
Sceptics have pointed out that causal direct impacts of
brain drain are difficult to show with absolute certainty.
They argue that access to healthcare, and health outcomes
in particular, depend on many other, arguably more signi-
ficant, factors, and physician migration has a very limited
role. “Internal brain drain” – the skewed distribution of
health workforce from rural/public jobs towards urban/
private jobs – and the inefficiency of public health work-
force management are taken to explain better bad health
outcomes in poor countries [14, 26].
These conclusions have in turn been called into question, as
they do not take into account the potential impact of all on-
going health initiatives had the health professionals stayed
[27]. To ascertain the net effect, more elaborate empirical
research is necessary and calls for studies with longer time
frames abound (e.g. [12]).
High-skilled emigration also has adverse impacts beyond
having fewer service providers on the ground. It amounts
to essential public resources wasted on education, less tax
revenue from high earners, a diminishing pool of teachers
and supervisors in medical training and education, declin-
ing quality of institutions and lost opportunities for polit-
ical change. Such economic and institutional losses can
profoundly impact overall institutional capacity for health-
related development [28, 29].
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Benefits of medical brain drain?
Remittances from emigrants are often cited as an important
benefit of medical brain drain, thought to reduce poverty
and encourage development. However, it has been argued
that remittances are sent home in limited amounts, too
small to compensate for the public investment in medical
training and its expected returns over a medical career [28],
and that the indirect and temporary benefits are not com-
mensurable with the permanent losses [30], particularly in
the long term [31]. Moreover, the countries most hit by the
health-workforce crisis have a comparatively low share of
remittances. The only exporter of health workforce among
the top 20 remittance-receiving countries is the Philippines
[30], an oft-cited exception with a surplus of health-work-
ers to export on the global market.
Source countries are also thought to benefit from returning
migrants and the related knowledge transfer. However, di-
aspora network efforts are voluntary and often limited to
assisting new emigrants. Data also suggest that few mi-
grants in fact return, and that targeted “return of talent” pro-
grammes to attract doctors and nurses to their country of
origin either fail or come at a very high cost [30].
The real beneficiaries of medical migration are the destina-
tion countries. As noted by a recent report of the American
Medical Association, “the entry of approximately 6,000 in-
ternational medical graduates into the United States every
year contributes a few billion dollars to the US economy,
which is equal to the output of 50 additional medical
schools without any cost to the taxpayer.” [32] In the Un-
ited Kingdom, medical education costs up to £250,000
($460,000) per individual, whereas immigrant health-
workers come at close to zero costs [33]. Packer et al. sug-
gest that just the South African physicians registered in
Canada in the 10 years after the apartheid saved the coun-
try $300 million [30].
Ethical issues
Is medical brain drain unethical?
It could be argued that while it obviously represents an
unfortunate state of affairs for poorer countries, medical
brain drain is not an ethical problem as such, or at least
not more problematic than other forms of labour migration,
which are usually tolerated or even welcomed. At first
glance it might be seen as the morally neutral consequence
of a globalising labour market and its competition for tal-
ent. The first question then is to ask whether, and if so
how, health-worker migration differs in a relevant sense
from individuals emigrating from India to work in US in-
formation technology (IT) or from Cote D’Ivoire to work
in French manufacturing, sending home remittances and
bringing knowledge and expertise when they return. There
are at least three answers to this question, which we can
only sketch here.
1. Global injustice: Medical brain drain is unethical
because the underlying causes are unjust.
A simple yet effective answer is to point out that health-
workers emigrating in droves from poor countries are a
symptom of the underlying gross inequalities between rich
and poor countries, which are a problem of global injustice.
Some contemporary global justice theories hold that ex-
treme poverty or deprivation of human needs or capabilit-
ies should be addressed on grounds of our shared humanity
(e.g. [34]), or as a duty to support global institutions that do
not harm the poor [35]. Others argue that the gap between
rich and poor nations should be constrained as the con-
dition of fair global economic and political relations (e.g.
[36]). In any case, medical brain drain is, in this view, un-
ethical as the symptom of the underlying problem of glob-
al injustice, and populations of poor countries should not
suffer detrimental effects on their healthcare because, and
on top of, the fact that they are worse-off than rich coun-
tries. The main ethical obligation following from this line
of argument is to work towards more global justice. Mean-
while, for those addressing more concrete problems, it also
follows that symptoms of global injustice, such as medical
brain drain leading to critical staff shortages, should be ad-
dressed as a matter of urgency [37, 38].
2. Human rights: Medical brain drain is unethical because
it violates human rights
Another response is to point out that under article 25 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from
1948, everyone has “the right to a standard of living ad-
equate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family”, including medical care and particular care and as-
sistance for children and mothers. Three of the eight UN
Millennium Development Goals are also health related.
While it may be notoriously difficult to specify what an
“adequate standard” is, it could be argued that where pop-
ulations are left with hardly any health professionals to
provide even the most basic healthcare, this could be seen
at least prima facie as a violation of their human rights, or
at least as undermining governments’ capacity to progress-
ively realise the human right to health. This line of argu-
ment has some complexities we cannot discuss here, but for
many it serves as a powerful explanation why health-work-
er migration, at least from the poorest regions of the world,
is unethical [13, 39].
3. The importance of health: Medical brain drain is
unethical because health is a special good that entails
special responsibilities
Others take the view, sometimes implicitly, that medical
brain drain is unethical because health is a special good and
providing healthcare comes with special obligations. Ar-
guments often focus on the fact that health is one of the
most basic capabilities enabling individuals to pursue their
life goals (e.g. [40]); or that health is necessary for indi-
viduals to take advantage of even the simplest opportunit-
ies in life [41]. Because sufficient health is a vital determ-
inant of a decent life, maintaining health, by the institutions
and individuals who are trained and capable of doing so, is
seen as a more binding responsibility than ensuring there
are enough IT workers around. Hence, brain drain leading
to critical shortages of health-workers is seen as unethical.
This view is in fact enshrined in most health professionals’
codes, which recognise special responsibilities of medical
professionals. It also underlies the public good perspective
on health provision: healthcare, addressing the special good
of health, is an important public good and a certain level of
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health-worker density is necessary for the primary care of
any population. Therefore, state institutions have a special
obligation to maintain an adequate density of health work-
force.
What are the specific ethical issues in medical brain
drain?
It is thus fair to say that a broad consensus exists that when
medical brain drain exacerbates critical staff shortages in
vulnerable regions, it is unethical. Notwithstanding this
general agreement, which policies to tackle brain drain are
justifiable on ethical grounds and how to best go about im-
plementing them remains highly controversial. It is there-
fore necessary to elaborate on two more specific ethical
challenges and highlight their complexity.
Aggregate individual choices versus societal effects
On the one hand, when health-workers leave, they exercise
their autonomy in pursuing their life plans [42]; the free-
dom to leave one’s country and free choice of profession
are codified as human rights in the UDHR. On the other
hand, these individual choices raise important ethical ques-
tions at the societal level; their aggregate effect has harmful
consequences for vulnerable populations and health sys-
tems. The question whether health-workers have a right to
freedom of professional movement or whether this may be
limited is one of the most central ethical conflicts underly-
ing debates about medical brain drain [43, 44]. Those who
claim an unconditional right to freedom of movement ar-
gue against any restrictions of emigration on an individu-
al level. Others respond that health-workers have particular
moral duties towards their society, which they fail to dis-
charge when they leave behind a population in dire need.
According to many, the global health crisis and its accom-
panying human resource crisis together result in such ex-
treme health deprivations in certain parts of the world, that
the human suffering and the lives at stake constitute suffi-
cient grounds for limiting medical professionals’ freedom
of movement. Healthcare workers, given their special skills
combined with local knowledge, are in a position to help
and ease suffering in a very tangible way [45]. Against this
one could argue that while health-workers have a profes-
sional obligation towards the sick, this duty is not tied to
their country of origin – the duty to cure does not imply
the duty to stay. There may be good practical reasons to fa-
vour local doctors with relevant local knowledge serving
local populations, but any such requirement assumes a pri-
or moral argument establishing a special duty to compatri-
ots.
Arguments for such a duty to compatriots rest either on
an idea of cost-benefit reciprocity, or on a broader idea
of social justice (for details see [42]). On the reciprocity
view, medical education involves public and social costs
and graduates have a duty to “pay back” the benefits to
the country that trained them, particularly in resource-poor
settings where medical training involves a disproportion-
ally high public investment. A broader version of this argu-
ment appeals to an idea of social justice, based on an under-
standing of society as a form of cooperation in which every
member plays her part in providing social goods. When
health-workers leave and health systems deteriorate, an es-
sential public good is jeopardised and privatised for per-
sonal benefit. Health-workers owe a duty of social justice
to their training society, requiring them to play their part in
the provision of social goods based on their acquired abil-
ities [46].
Distribution of benefits and burdens and resulting
responsibilities
The first section illustrated the harms and burdens for poor
source countries that follow from medical brain drain.
Destination countries, in contrast, benefit in several ways
from medical brain drain: additional health-workers sup-
plementing the national workforce without the cost and ef-
fort of full medical training, less need to scale up national
medical education to meet growing demand; increased sta-
bility of healthcare provision; lower healthcare labour
costs, with immigrant health-workers often receiving lower
wages and benefits.
This distribution, where benefits accrue in those countries
already far better off, but related severe harms are visited
on poor countries and their populations, is considered
clearly unethical by most, based on objections to harm,
benefitting from harm and growing inequalities between
countries. It has been called a form of “reverse foreign aid”
or “de facto perverse subsidies” from the poor to the rich
[29, 47]. Recruitment of health-workers from poor coun-
tries by rich countries has accordingly been labelled “theft”
or “poaching” [48, 49]. In any case, destination countries
that under-plan their health workforce and medical training
capabilities, relying on foreign-trained professionals to fill
systematic gaps in their staff, engage at least in so-called
“passive recruitment” [50].
Against this view it has been pointed out that, because
of the difficulty to calculate net effects of medical brain
drain on health systems and outcomes, the argument that
international recruitment is unethical fails [26]. As shown
above, this view has been challenged as a result of the
way it interprets data. But even apart from the question
of demonstrating causality, international recruitment can
be framed as a matter of justice. It is obvious that there
are not just market forces at work in medical brain drain,
but that institutional and policy choices in medical educa-
tion, healthcare and immigration in destination countries
have a strong impact [51]. The latest OECD report [52]
summarily refers to medical brain drain as a “quick and
inexpensive fix” for under-planning of work forces; with
governments increasing recruitment, streamlining their im-
migration policies and tailoring their eligibility criteria for
training in order to facilitate the entry of foreign graduates.
At the same time, source countries do not receive any com-
pensation for their loss of public investment. Even if re-
cruitment did not have any significant effect on health sys-
tems and outcomes [26], which is highly doubtful, it could
thus still be seen as unethical owing to the lack of dis-
tributive justice.
In sum, the strongest ethical imperative would be on the
perpetrators of the harms – destination countries – to alle-
viate the burden on source countries; and indeed a number
of proposals are discussed below how this could be done
effectively.
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However, the situation is complicated by the fact that
source countries could be seen as coresponsible for the
emigration flow. Countries investing into training medical
students and failing to attach any requirement of service or
repayment have been called at fault for making bad invest-
ments [53]. Moreover, the reasons for the failure to retain
the national health workforce are at least to some degree
under the control and responsibility of source country gov-
ernments (the degree of responsibility will vary depending
on whether these factors can be attributed to bad policy
choices or to factors outside of government control, such as
severe resource constraints, heritage of the past or condi-
tioning by international incentive structures [35]).
Policy proposals
Notwithstanding a general consensus that medical brain
drain needs to be addressed where it exacerbates critical
health-worker shortages, it is far from obvious how the
general ethical obligation to act translates into effective
and proportionate policy. From an ethical point of view,
where health systems and populations are directly harmed
by avoidable conduct, mainly of rich destination countries,
such conduct must be regulated and sanctioned. Which oth-
er policy interventions to prioritise, however, is a more
challenging questions. Individual rights need to be bal-
anced against societal demands, and harms done by source
countries themselves should be factored in as well.
Destination countries and international interventions
Achieve self-sufficiency
Destination countries' failure to achieve a sustainable
health workforce and their under-funding of medical edu-
cation need to be addressed with urgency [17, 50]. The
World Health Organisation (WHO) Global Code on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel [54] calls
on destination countries to achieve self-sufficiency in hu-
man resources for health. Some worry that, unlike in a
free international labour market, would-be emigrating doc-
tors and nurses could lose what might be their only escape
from dire working and living conditions [55]. Therefore,
it is not enough to aim for self-sufficiency alone; instead
there should be accompanying development assistance for
source countries, to improve health systems and working
conditions for local workers who otherwise might have le-
gitimate aspirations to leave [11, 52].
Temporary work visas
These might provide a solution in this latter regard: They
encourage the migration of medical graduates with the par-
ticular purpose to enhance their skills and knowledge,
which eventually flow back to benefit the source commu-
nity and its healthcare system [55]. Hence they offer a
temporary option for those wanting to leave, which might
benefit them personally, as well as a benefit for source
countries upon return. Questions remain about potential co-
erciveness and enforcement policies of such visas.
Compensation for loss
Another proposal to address the problem of “reverse aid”
is for destination countries to pay back the costs of educa-
tion or as much as is needed to replace a graduating doc-
tor. Others suggest a compensation measure based on the
gains each recruited health-worker means to the destination
country [28]). Not all losses through brain drain are com-
mensurable. Poor countries lose their “best and brightest”
and their knowledge and quality of institutions are under-
mined [27]. Nonetheless, compensation schemes would go
a long way to offset the harm done by medical brain drain.
Ethical recruitment
Various national- and international-level efforts have been
made to adopt codes of practice for ethical recruitment, in
which countries voluntarily commit to good conduct in the
process of recruitment as well as refraining from recruit-
ment from a list of vulnerable health systems with severe
staff shortages [54, 56]. The effect of these codes is am-
bivalent and reception is mixed: Buchan et. al. [57] report
a declining trend in health-worker migration after the in-
troduction of the UK Code, but warn that trend data alone
cannot demonstrate causality and other factors might be
relevant (on the limits of ethical codes see also [58, 59]).
Plotnikova recently pointed out that in public discussions
and the practice of recruitment the rights of migrant work-
ers seem to prevail over those of source populations [60].
Ethical recruitment has also been described as distorting
a fair global labour market [55] or as a seemingly coer-
cive measure [43] given that it constrains the profession-
al choices of health-workers born or trained in critical re-
gions. It might be preferable, then, to have mandatory self-
sufficiency schemes in destination countries, which would
make recruitment from poor regions less or even unneces-
sary in the longer term.
Source countries
Closing the wage gap
Closing the wage gap between source and destination
countries would directly address one of the main causes
triggering medical migration. There is recent evidence
from Ghana that a wage rise might slightly reduce the out-
flow [61]. However, most source countries with critical
shortages are hardly in a position to reduce the wage gap,
let alone close it [3]. From an ethical point of view, be-
neficiaries, that is, destination countries, and perhaps the
migrants themselves may be called upon to share the bur-
den and channel their foreign assistance into financing jobs
in public health systems (sometimes called “ethical foreign
aid”).
Training and improvement of health systems
Although financial assistance from destination countries is
important from an ethical point of view, there is an onus
on source countries to contribute as well. Mainly, poor
working conditions need to be addressed, health systems
strengthened, and education and training bolstered. There
are encouraging signs of this happening, for example in
South Africa [62], and official reports suggest that source
countries are adopting various creative measures to scale-
up and improve their health education [64]. However, as
the OECD [3] notes, again sufficient improvement realist-
ically cannot be realised without long-term financial sup-
port from the international community.
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Staff retention measures
A number of proposals aim to retain staff, targeting es-
pecially remote rural areas that suffer most from critical
shortages. Targeted admission schemes are based on em-
pirical findings that health professionals from rural back-
grounds are more likely to choose rural areas for their prac-
tice. Clinical rotations in a rural setting may also affect
medical graduates’ decision to work in deprived areas. Oth-
er measures include priority for doctors and nurses working
in remote areas for professional development opportun-
ities, such as faster promotion, training, fellowships, re-
search grants, etc. [64]. All these are fairly unproblematic
from an ethical point of view and should be supported. Ad-
apting curricula [64] or locally specialised medical train-
ing [43, 45] to improve competences in rural health matters
and in tackling locally relevant disease has also been sug-
gested for resource-poor settings. Community-based, pre-
ventive, low-tech training is already practiced in Cuba,
Venezuela and several African medical schools [43].
However, locally specialised medical training has been cri-
ticised for depriving doctors of relevant – emigration en-
hancing – skills, and could be seen as source countries
curbing the opportunities and right to freedom of move-
ment and occupation of their health-workers. Against this
it has been argued that “local specialisation involves no
threats, humiliation, or exploitation, it leaves acceptable
alternatives open to candidates and it affects the options
of only a small number of rather well-off citizens” [43].
As such it would on balance be ethically permissible, but
the policy remains controversial. A less invasive approach
would be to focus on the “hidden curriculum” in medical
education, focusing on inducing social responsibility in
medical graduates towards their local poor and ill. This
avoids the concern about coercion and would therefore be
preferable; however, such “soft” educational reform takes
time and might not be effective unless other policy inter-
vention address the powerful financial incentives for mi-
gration currently in place.
“Return of talent” programmes
These programmes have been adopted in several countries
(e.g. Ghana, Zimbabwe). Empirical studies suggest that
they are very costly and the number of returnees is low.
Few medical emigrants want to return, especially when
the reasons why they left are still there. Moreover, incent-
ive schemes, which include higher remuneration, might
have undesirable effects on intrasocietal income differen-
ces. Those professionals who stay behind and see them-
selves as loyal to their country of origin taking the burden
of staff shortages might feel unfairly treated by their gov-
ernment [30].
Exit requirements
A powerful tool to stop medical graduates from emigrating,
at least for a short period, is a compulsory service require-
ment made part of their degree. Seventy countries currently
apply (or have in the past) some kind of compulsory ser-
vice requirement. In some cases, such as in India, this has
faced strong local protest (cited in [65]). Another option
is tax burdening the emigrating health-workers to recoup
the costs of their medical training. Both types of exit re-
quirements raise some issues from an ethical point of view,
such as how to determine fairly the length of mandatory
service or how much migrants should be expected to pay.
Secondly, as isolated measures they would shift the bur-
den of compensation for medical brain drain towards mi-
grants only, while destination countries and their popula-
tions benefit freely. Finally, exit requirements have been
regarded as the most coercive towards health-workers, vi-
olating their autonomy, right to freedom of movement, and
professional and personal choice (e.g. [64]).
Conclusion
In this review we have shown that while medical brain
drain presents an urgent problem and general ethical ar-
guments can be made to address it, some ethical conflicts
complicate the picture, such as the conflict between indi-
vidual rights of health-workers to move and the societal
need for them to stay. These conflicts make it challenging
to develop “ideal” policy interventions. However, we poin-
ted out several options that are more or less straightforward
from an ethical point of view, at least under nonideal cir-
cumstances. A promising strategy seems to be one of “es-
calating” policies, starting with the uncontroversial ones,
and taking into account variations between countries. A
multilayered way with several interlocking policy options
that work towards the same goal would be best, where un-
desirable effects on the rights of individuals can be minim-
ised as much as possible and other negative consequences
of intervening in the migration flow, such as a reduction of
knowledge transfer, can be minimised.
Where critical shortage exists, targeted development efforts
to improve working and living conditions in source coun-
tries, as well as compensation for loss incurred (at least in
terms of education) are uncontroversial first-step policies.
They are however challenging to implement and therefore
need far stronger recognition and support within the inter-
national debate. Other first-step policies are efforts to instil
loyalty through the “hidden curriculum” in source coun-
tries. Second-step policies are those that would decrease
the flow of migration by reducing demand. Source coun-
tries should devote more investment to improving their
health systems, scaling up education and introducing meas-
ures to make staying more attractive to their local work
force, so that the push-factors for brain drain are reduced.
Destination countries should make enforceable commit-
ments not to recruit from countries with critical shortages
as well as strong efforts to become self-sufficient in their
health workforce, thus minimising the pull-factors. This
should be coupled with the aforementioned financial and
development assistance for source countries, to help im-
prove local working conditions and build capacities in local
health systems. If conditions in source countries improve
without sufficient impact on migration flow, restriction of
movement through staff retention measures can be dis-
cussed as a third-step policy intervention. In all this it is
vital to be aware that national levels are important but in-
sufficient for effective policy implementation owing to col-
lective action problems, and lack of continuous financing
and binding governance tools. Some therefore suggest set-
ting up a Global Health Resource Fund to provide continu-
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ous funding and coordinated global governance in address-
ing medical brain drain [66].
Finally, the search for novel ideas to address medical brain
drain should be continued. For example, a recent innov-
ative model called “third-country development” envisages
health-workers who have emigrated from the Global South
being mobilised for humanitarian work on a mission in
another country that has critical shortages. In effect, this
would be a temporary migration scheme establishing a sort
of “international health-keeping corps” [67]. Motivation
might be a problem for this model, but it points towards
some as yet unexplored potential to address medical brain
drain.
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